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Essay XV: Of Seditions And Troubles
Essay XV: Of Seditions And Troubles
Shepherds of people had need know the calendars ^1 of tempests in state;
which are commonly greatest when things grow to equality; as natural tempests
are greatest about the Equinoctia. And as there are certain hollow blasts of
wind and secret swellings of seas before a tempest, so are there in states:
---Ille etiam caecos instare tumultus
Saepe monet, fraudesque et operta tumescere bella.
[Of troubles imminent and treasons dark
Thence warning comes, and wars in secret gathering. Virgil]
Libels and licentious discourses against the state, when they are frequent and
open; and in like sort, false news often running up and down to the
disadvantage of the state, and hastily embraced; are amongst the signs of
troubles. Virgil, giving the pedigree of Fame, saith she was sister to the
Giants:
Illam Terra parens, ira irritata deorum,
Extremam (ut perhibent) Coeo Enceladoque sororem
Progenuit.
[Footnote 1: Weather predictions.]
[Her, Parent Earth, furious with the anger of the gods, brought forth, the
youngest sister (as they affirm) of Coeus and Enceladus.] As if fames ^2 were
the relics of seditions past; but they are no less indeed the preludes of
seditions to come. Howsoever he noteth it right, that seditious tumults and
seditious fames differ no more but as brother and sister, masculine and
feminine; especially if it come to that, that the best actions of a state, and
the most plausible, and which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in
ill sense, and traduced: for that shows the envy great, as Tacitus saith;
conflata magna invidia, seu bene seu male gesta premunt [when dislike
prevails against the government, good actions and bad offend alike]. Neither
doth it follow, that because these fames are a sign of troubles that the
suppressing of them with too much severity should be a remedy of troubles.
For the despising of them many times checks them best; and the going about to
stop them doth but make a wonder long-lived. Also that kind of obedience
which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held suspected: Erant in officio, sed
tamen qui mallent mandata imperantium interpretari quam exequi [Ready to
serve, and yet more disposed to construe commands than execute them];
disputing, excusing, cavilling upon mandates and directions, is a kind of
shaking off the yoke, and assay of disobedience; especially if in those
disputings they which are for the direction speak fearfully and tenderly, and
those that are against it audaciously.
[Footnote 2: Rumors.]
Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be common
parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side, it is as a boat that
is overthrown by uneven weight on the one side; as was well seen in the time
of Henry the Third of France; for first himself entered league for the
extirpation of the Protestants; and presently after the same league was turned
upon himself. For when the authority of princes is made but an accessory to
a cause, and that there be other bands that tie faster than the band of
sovereignty, kings begin to be put almost out of possession.
Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions are carried openly and
audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of government is lost. For the motions
of the greatest persons in a government ought to be as the motions of the
planets under primum mobile; ^3 (according to the old opinion), which is, that
every of them is carried swiftly by the highest motion, and softly in their
own motion. And therefore, when great ones in their own particular motion move
violently, and, as Tacitus expresseth it well, liberius quam ut imperantium
meminissent [unrestrained by reverence for the government], it is a sign the
orbs are out of frame. For reverence is that wherewith princes are girt from
God; who threateneth the dissolving thereof; Solvam cingula regum [I will
unbind the girdles of kings].
[Footnote 3: In the old astronomy, the primum mobile (first moving) was the
outer sphere, whose motion from east to west dominated the motions of the
inner spheres of the planets.]
So when any of the four pillars of government are mainly shaken or
weakened (which are religion, justice, counsel, and treasure), men had need to
pray for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of predictions
(concerning which, nevertheless, more light may be taken from that which
followeth); and let us speak first of the materials of seditions; then of the
motives of them; and thirdly of the remedies.
Concerning the materials of seditions. It is a thing well to be
considered; for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do bear it)
is to take away the matter of them. For if there be fuel prepared, it is hard
to tell whence the spark shall come that shall set it on fire. The matter of
seditions is of two kinds: much poverty and much discontentment. It is
certain, so many overthrown estates, so many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth
well the state of Rome before the Civil War,
Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore foenus,
Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile bellum.
[Hence estates eaten up by usurious rates of interest, and interest greedy of
time, hence credit shaken, and war a gain to many.]
This same multis utile bellum is an assured and infallible sign of a
state disposed to seditions and troubles. And if this poverty and broken
estate in the better sort be joined with a want and necessity in the mean
people, the danger is imminent and great. For the rebellions of the belly ^4
are the worst. As for discontentments, they are in the politic body like to
humors in the natural, which are apt to gather a preternatural heat and to
inflame. And let no prince measure the danger of them by this, whether they be
just or unjust: for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable; who do
often spurn at their own good: nor yet by this, whether the griefs whereupon
they rise be in fact great or small: for they are the most dangerous
discontentments where the fear is greater than the feeling. Dolendi modus,
timendi non item [Suffering has its limit, but fears are endless]. Besides, in
great oppressions, the same things that provoke the patience, do withal mate
^5 the courage; but in fears it is not so. Neither let any prince or state be
secure ^6 concerning discontentments, because they have been often, or have
been long, and yet no peril hath ensued: for as it is true that every vapor or
fume doth not turn into a storm; so it is nevertheless true that storms,
though they blow over divers times, yet may fall at last; and, as the Spanish
proverb noteth well, The cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull.
[Footnote 4: From hunger.]
[Footnote 5: Confound.]
[Footnote 6: Free from care.]
The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion; taxes;
alteration of laws and customs; breaking of privileges; general oppression;
advancement of unworthy persons; strangers; dearths; disbanded soldiers;
factions grown desperate; and whatsoever, in offending people, joineth and
knitteh them in a common cause.
For the remedies; there may be some general preservatives, whereof we
will speak: as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular disease;
and so be left to counsel rather than rule.
The first remedy or prevention is to remove by all means possible that
material cause of sedition whereof we spake; which is, want and poverty in
the estate. To which purpose serveth the opening and well-balancing of trade;
the cherishing of manufactures; the banishing of idleness; the repressing of
waste and excess by sumptuary ^7 laws; the improvement and husbanding of the
soil; the regulating of prices of things vendible; the moderating of taxes and
tributes; and the like. Generally, it is to be foreseen ^8 that the population
of a kingdom (especially if it be not mown down by wars) do not exceed the
stock of the kingdom which should maintain them. Neither is the population to
be reckoned only by number; for a smaller number that spend more and earn less
do wear out an estate sooner than a greater number that live lower and gather
more. Therefore the multiplying of nobility and other degrees of quality in
an over proportion to the common people doth speedily bring a state to
necessity; and so doth likewise an overgrown clergy; for they bring nothing to
the stock; and in like manner, when more are bred scholars than preferments
can take off.
[Footnote 7: Against extravagance.]
[Footnote 8: Guarded against beforehand.]
It is likewise to be remembered, that forasmuch as the increase of any
estate must be upon the foreigner (for whatsover is somewhere gotten is
somewhere lost), there be but three things which one nation selleth unto
another; the commodity as nature yielded it; the manufacture; and the vecture,
or carriage. So that if these three wheels go, wealth will flow as in a spring
tide. And it cometh many times to pass, that materiam superabit opus; that the
work and carriage is more worth than the material, and enricheth a state more;
as is notably seen in the Low-Countrymen, who have the best mines above ground
in the world.
Above all things, good policy is to be used that the treasure and moneys
in a state be not gathered into few hands. For otherwise a state may have a
great stock, and yet starve. And money is like muck, not good except it be
spread. This is done chiefly by suppressing or at least keeping a strait hand
upon the devouring trades of usury, ingrossing ^9 great pasturages, and the
like.
[Footnote 9: "Cornering."]
For removing discontentments, or at least the danger of them; there is in
every state (as we know) two portions of subjects; the noblesse and the
commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not great; for
common people are of slow motion, if they be not excited by the greater sort;
and the greater sort are of small strength, except the multitude be apt and
ready to move of themselves. Then is the danger, when the greater sort do but
wait for the troubling of the waters amongst the meaner, that then they may
declare themselves. The poets feign that the rest of the gods would have bound
Jupiter; which he hearing of, by the counsel of Pallas, sent for Briareus,
with his hundred hands, to come in to his aid. An emblem, no doubt, to show
how safe it is for monarchs to make sure of the good will of common people. To
give moderate liberty for griefs and discontentments to evaporate (so it be
without too great insolency or bravery), is a safe way. For he that turneth
the humors back, and maketh the wound bleed inwards, endangereth malign ulcers
and pernicious imposthumations. ^10
[Footnote 10: Abscesses.]
The part of Epimetheus ^11 mought well become Prometheus ^12 in the case
of discontentments: for there is not a better provision against them.
Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid, and kept
hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly, the politic and artificial
nourishing and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men from hopes to hopes, is
one of the best antidotes against the poison of discontentments. And it is a
certain sign of a wise government and proceeding, when it can hold men`s
hearts by hopes, when it cannot by satisfaction; and when it can handle things
in such manner, as no evil shall appear so peremptory but that it hath some
outlet of hope; which is the less hard to do, because both particular persons
and factions are apt enough to flatter themselves, or at least to brave that
which they believe not.
[Footnote 11: Afterthought.]
[Footnote 12: Forethought.]
Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head
whereunto discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may join, is a
known, but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit head to be one
that hath greatness and reputation; that hath confidence with the discontented
party, and upon whom they turn their eyes; and that is thought discontented in
his own particular: which kind of persons are either to be won and reconciled
to the state, and that in a fast and true manner; or to be fronted with some
other of the same party, that may oppose them, and so divide the reputation.
Generally, the dividing and breaking of all factions and combinations that are
adverse to the state, and setting them at distance, or at least distrust,
amongst themselves, is not one of the worst remedies. For it is a desperate
case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the state be full of discord
and faction, and those that are against it be entire and united.
I have noted that some witty and sharp speeches which have fallen from
princes have given fire to seditions. Caesar did himself infinite hurt in that
speech, Sylla nescivit literas, non potuit dictare [Sylla was no scholar, he
could not dictate]; for it did utterly cut off that hope which men had
entertained, that he would at one time or other give over his dictatorship.
Galba undid himself by that speech, legi a se militem, non emi [that he did
not buy his soldiers, but levied them]; for it put the soldiers out of hope of
the donative. ^13 Probus likewise, by that speech, Si vixero, non opus erit
amplius Roman imperio militibus [If I live, the Roman empire shall have no
more need of soldiers]; a speech of great despair for the soldiers. And many
the like. Surely princes had need, in tender matters and ticklish times, to
beware what they say; especially in these short speeches, which fly abroad
like darts, and are thought to be shot out of their secret intentions. For as
for large discourses, they are flat things, and not so much noted.
[Footnote 13: Gifts of money.]
Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great
person, one or rather more, of military valor, near unto them, for the
repressing of seditions in their beginnings. For without that, there useth to
be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of troubles than were
fit. And the state runneth the danger of that which Tacitus saith; Atque is
habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent,
omnes paterentur [A few were in a humor to attempt mischief, more to desire,
all to allow it]. But let such military persons be assured, and well reputed
of, rather than factious and popular; holding also good correspondence with
the other great men in the state; or else the remedy is worse than the
disease.
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