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Essay XIX: Of Empire
Essay XIX: Of Empire
It is a miserable state of mind to have few things to desire, and many
things to fear; and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being at the
highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing; and
have many representations of perils and shadows, which makes their minds the
less clear. And this is one reason also of that effect which the Scripture
speaketh of, That the king`s heart is inscrutable. For multitude of
jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire that should marshal and put
in order all the rest, maketh any man`s heart hard to find or sound. Hence it
comes likewise, that princes many times make themselves desires, and set their
hearts upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an
order; sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining
excellency in some art or feat of the hand; as Nero for playing on the harp,
Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at
fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible
unto those that know not the principle that the mind of man is more cheered
and refreshed by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay in
great. We see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors in their
first years, it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but
that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes, turn in their
latter years to be superstitious and melancholy; as did Alexander the Great;
Diocletian; and in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for he that is
used to go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favor, and is
not the thing he was.
To speak now of the true temper ^1 of empire, it is a thing rare and hard
to keep; for both temper and distemper consist of contraries. But it is one
thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answer of
Apollonius to Vespasian is full of excellent instruction. Vespasian asked
him, What was Nero`s overthrow? He answered, Nero could touch and tune the
harp well; but in government sometimes he used to wind the pins too high,
sometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is that nothing destroyeth
authority so much as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed
too far, and relaxed too much.
[Footnote 1: Proportion.]
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes`
affairs is rather fine deliveries and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs when
they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. But this
is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men beware how they neglect and
suffer matter of trouble to be prepared; for no man can forbid the spark, nor
tell whence it may come. The difficulties in princes` business are many and
great; but the greatest difficulty is often in their own mind. For it is
common with princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt plerumque
regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariae [Their desires are
commonly vehement and incompatible one with another]. For it is the
solecism ^2 of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the
mean.
[Footnote 2: Absurd mistake.]
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their children,
their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their second-nobles or gentlemen,
their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and from all these
arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (the
occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth; which is, that
princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do ever grow so
(by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the
like), as they become more able to annoy them than they were. And this is
generally the work of standing counsels to foresee and to hinder it. During
that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the
First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch
kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two
would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by
a war; and would not in any wise take up peace at interest. And the like was
done by that league (which Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made
between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza,
potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion
of some of the Schoolmen to be received, that a war cannot justly be made but
upon a precedent injury or provocation. For there is no question but a just
fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause
of a war.
For their wives; there are cruel examples of them. Livia is infamed for
the poisoning of her husband; Roxalana, Solyman`s wife, was the destruction
of that renowned prince Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise troubled his house and
succession; Edward the Second of England his queen had the principal hand in
the deposing and murther of her husband. This kind of danger is then to be
feared chiefly, when the wives have plots for the raising of their own
children; or else that they be advoutresses. ^3
[Footnote 3: Adulteresses.]
For their children; the tragedies likewise of dangers from them have
been many. And generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of their
children hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha (that we
named before) was so fatal to Solyman`s line, as the succession of the Turks
from Solyman until this day is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood;
for that Selymus the Second was thought to be suppositious. The destruction
of Crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his
father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for both Constantinus and
Constance, his sons died violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did
little better; who died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken
arms against him. The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of
Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of repentance. And many like
examples there are; but few or none where the fathers had good by such
distrust; except it were where the sons were up in open arms against them; as
was Selymus the First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry the
Second, King of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger
from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus and Thomas Becket, Archbishops
of Canterbury; who with their croziers did almost try it with the king`s
sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty kings, William Rufus,
Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger is not from that state, but
where it hath a dependence of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come
in and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or particular patrons,
but by the people.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to
depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less able to
perform any thing that he desires. I have noted it in my History of King
Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his nobility; whereupon it came
to pass that his times were full of difficulties and troubles; for the
nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not co-operate
with him in his business. So that in effect he was fain to do all things
himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a
body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt;
besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not
too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate in authority with the
common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
For their merchants; they are vena porta; ^4 and if they flourish not,
a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish little.
Taxes and imposts upon them do seldom good to the king`s revenue; for that
that he wins in the hundred he leeseth ^5 in the shire; the particular rates
being increased, but the total bulk of trading rather decreased.
[Footnote 4: The "gate-vein," which Bacon regarded as distributing nourishment
to the body.]
[Footnote 5: Loseth.]
For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be where
they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of
religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state where they live and remain
in a body; and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the
janizaries, ^6 and pretorian bands ^7 of Rome; but trainings of men, and arming
them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives,
are things of defence, and no danger.
[Footnote 6: Bodyguard of the Sultan.]
[Footnote 7: Bodyguard of the Roman emperors.]
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and
which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings are in
effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es homo; and
memento quod es Deus, or vice Dei [Remember that you are a man; and remember
that you are a God, or God`s lieutenant]; the one bridleth their power, and
the other their will.
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